(please note: translations are by machine)

dutch   french   german   italian   russian   spanish

RRX is conducting preliminary research of next generation constitutional design.

Notably the apparently somewhat daunting task, of forming what might be considered an advanced system of government, likely more appropriate, for a collection of participants of erudite demeanour, than an emerging nation state, perhaps from millennia of less elegant arbitration, may be beneficial, for long term stability though possibly rather tense, in the transition phase. Clearly the critical transitional phase, possibly leading to more advanced forms of arbitration for a de facto body politic, or symbiotic arrangement of some form, might proceed in an idyllic manner with rapid and massive consensus leading to constitutional formation, in a philosophically amenable context with appropriate ratification, on the part of all participants, or at least, a vast majority. However possibly more commonly one might find progress for an arbitrary planetary system may occur in a more fragmented and complex fashion, with voluntary external mentors of some form supplying guidance, implying inevitable disciplinary action for negotiations, as required to promote the delicate, empathy building process, leading to an intricate balance of information space sensibility, likely inferred in any advanced political system.

The underlying theory leading to the proposition of a formal constitution apparently implies a body politic of arbitrary form, composed of synthetic frame of reference supporting participants, whom might adopt mutually agreed restrictions of freedoms, on the basis of constraints in the form of general algorithms, which have no particular selectivity with respect to the participants, in general. Clearly one might consider the actions of any subsequent representational subset which abrogates this fundamental agreement, possibly by invoking an Act in conflict with the constitution, might possibly upon arbitration dissolve the fabric of the body politic, and any obligations an arbitrary participant may have had. In terms of basic design one might imply a constitutional document of merit, for an arbitrary body politic of arbitrary participants, may inevitably share critical commonalties of interest to all possible participants of any body politic, in a very stable format such as to minimise the chance of subsequent abrogation. As a potential member of a body politic is apparently an "active component" and it seems generally assumed of arbitrary characteristic, except possibly insofar as basic ability to support a synthetic frame of reference of some form, one might imply the core design may in general incorporate an explicit reference to this principle. From the temporal perspective one might assume that if "ad indefinitum" is the basic reality, the theoretical structures of a constitutional approach might it seems be scalable in direct proportion. Such long-term scalability implies equivalent application to participants in the far future, possibly of somewhat altered characteristics. Existing constitutions in general are apparently purportedly binding considerations, for a set of prospective participants with respect to possible factors of mutual interest, within an ongoing context for a particular body politic. Generally if no cut-off date or temporal limitation is specified in a constitution, the assumption is for the effective duration of the body politic or "de facto ad indefinitum". Notably constitutional documents do not apparently necessarily conform to any consistent theory of the body politic in general. However a viable constitution is apparently considered by some, to be the fundamental, and only basis, for the legality of any subsequent additions or changes in the form of, for example rules, decrees, bills, acts or amendments. Clearly one of the main roles of representative subsets of the body politic is to ensure that subsequent detailed measures are well aligned with both the meaning of a constitution, and the implications derived from it. Obviously a body politic that undermines this relationship will it seems be negating the fundamental agreements, on which the entire system is based. A particular body politic constitutional document might be interpreted in a future context, where there are implications of scalability issues, in the design. The provisions for representation of the participants, for example, in a condensed representational subsystem might take into account future factors, in advance. Clearly there are many far future factors which might make an appropriately designed "next generation constitutional algorithm" an adaptive approach, reducing the requirement for potentially expensive amendment systems. In the context of putting forward a next generation constitutional approach, one might be wise to minimize complexity as far as possible, such that the average participant of ones de facto body politic, is able to fully comprehend the implications. Often one of the primary factors of constitutional design is provision for the protection of the "freedoms" of the prospective participants, on an arbitrary basis. If one implies in a constitution the inviolate rights, of an arbitrary participant in a body politic to a set of freedoms, or rights, then clearly any attempt by any other member or set of members of the body politic, to introduce measures which infringe on those freedoms or rights, would be illegal. This is it seems one of the major potential attractions of the constitutional system. If such were not the case a constitution would likely offer little protection, to the prospective participants from the vagaries of vested interest, that might infest eccentric representational subsystems over the course of millennia. Clearly as such one of the main concerns of next generation constitution design, might be the effective defence of all participants from possibly potentially numerous, prolonged, eccentric and somewhat unpredictable intermediating representational subsystems. Apparently as eccentric representational subsystems might attempt to selectively discriminate against a particular subset, of the prospective participants on the basis of systematic characteristics, of some form, extremely robust countervailing mechanisms in the design may be advisable, to protect against such obvious abuse. In particular the careful design of ones constitution in this reguard, seems likely to form the main source of enduring value and comfort, to future generations of prospective participants.

One might wonder how the principles of a constitutional approach may be upheld, if for example those promulgating violations were also, somewhat ironically, responsible for maintaining constitutional integrity. Clearly this is potentially the weakest part of the design of the system, possibly implying an external enforcement mechanism, of some form, may be advisable. A quasi-external system might be attempted by the participants, in the form of a rule based constitutional court, of some form, based on representative participants, however one might be somewhat leery of trusting such a mechanism in the long term, if participants responsible might be subject to undue influence. Another possibility might be to set up an external system in the form of purely machine based rule checking. The main weakness of this approach might be the potential susceptibility, of such a machine to destruction, modification, interference or unintended interpretation, of some form. Clearly a machine system, assuming appropriate next generation technology, might optionally be tasked with monitoring the possibly temporary representatives, and agents of a body politic for strict conformance to provisions, of a constitution, and any subsequent changes, or additions. In this case the entire set of constitutional documents and underlying principles might be encoded, in a form amenable to machine interpretation and any subsequent modifications, in the form of rules, decrees, bills, acts or amendments would, it seems, be similarly coded for processing and conflict checking. Notably changes or additions which either selectively enhance or discriminate, even slightly, against a systematic subset of the body politic might not be likely to pass such a potentially stringent system. While a high level of constitutional conformance might be desirable from a purely philosophical perspective, one might find it quite frustrating in practice, as few changes or additions may pass such a system without reduction to purely equivalent functionality, with respect to an arbitrary member of the body politic of arbitrary characteristics, possibly diluting practical effect somewhat for near term issues. One might be the beneficiary of such a system, however, in the long term as a reduction of possibly selective or discriminatory changes or additions might, it seems, be for the most part eliminated, reducing the scope of "garbage collection" at some later date. Clearly purely equivalent status on the part of participants of the body politic, enforced by machine, although possibly reassuring in terms of safety from selective persecution, might produce somewhat unexpected results. One of the unexpected benefits of such an approach may be the ready interpretation, of even potentially complex issues, in a rapid cost effective manner. From the perspective of a planetary system, of de facto political arrangements, some of which may purportedly be constitutionally based, one may be inclined to consider if some limited form of automated approach, might be advantageous.